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Abstract 
The effectiveness of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
in regulating digital markets is at doubt. Research has shown that due to advancement of digital 
markets and its specific characteristics, the impact on traditional standards is high, requiring 
modifications. This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of EU competition law and 
demonstrate proposals to enforce the law more efficiently. By targeting the digitalization era, it 
asks: To what extent EU competition law, in particular Article 102 TFEU is effective in regulating 
digital markets? 
Based on a review of Article 102 TFEU, the European Commission’s decisions, the 
Commission’s Guidance, the CJEU case law and economic concepts, analysis demonstrated that 
by enforcing Article 102 TFEU, there are far more downsides than strengths in regulating digital 
markets efficiency. The results indicate that EU competition law, in particular Article 102 TFEU 
is effective in regulating digital markets to low extent. On this basis, it is recommended to 
supplement enforcement of Article 102 TFEU by sector-specific regulation, broader definitions, 
different standards of proof and replace traditional tests.  
Summary 
The title of the Bachelor Thesis is Effectiveness of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) in Regulating Digital Markets. It concerns the topic of 
digitalization, new economy and dynamic innovation. Digitalization offers free services, 
increases data availability for society and modifies the current standards and economic models. 
However, it draws attention to supremacy by some of the digital platforms. Thus, the issue of the 
thesis is that current framework of EU competition law, specifically Article 102 TFEU,  in 
regulating digital markets is questionable. This thesis has two major purposes: (1) to evaluate the 
effectiveness of EU competition law in regulating digital markets; (2) to demonstrate the 
neediness of supplementing it by more efficient enforcement and regulation. The Bachelor Thesis 
is examined by doctrinal research or qualitative research, placing importance to teleological 
interpretation. Additionally, the thesis is based on interdisciplinary research of law and 
economics, integrating concepts. 
The Bachelor Thesis has four body parts and each of them is dealing with the issue described 
above. Part I describes Article 102 TFEU, its history, types of abuses, the procedure of abuse 
cases, the concepts of dominant position’ and ‘abuse’, definition of relevant market, market 
power, issues of Article 102 TFEU in respect to digital markets. Part II analyzes multi-sided 
markets, its characteristics, innovation, network effects, economies of scale, marginal costs, lock-
in effects and interoperability. Moreover, presents the Google Android case as multi-sided market 
from the perspective of the Commission and Kent Walker (Google’s Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel). Part III emphasizes tying and bundling issue involved in Article 102 (d) TFEU 
and why it is considered as an abuse, referring to the leading case Microsoft v. Commission and 
analyzing Microsoft’s arguments against. Part VI underlines the need of strong technical 
resources and sufficient economic analyses and proposes that  in order to effectively regulate 
digital markets, taking into account the view of legal scholars and European Parliament. 
Furthermore, it discusses the solutions proposed by three experts appointed by Margrethe 
Vestager, such as broadening definitions, imposing timeframe and use different tests conducting 
analysis when enforcing competition law.  
The Bachelor Thesis concludes that by enforcing Article 102 TFEU, there are far more downsides 
than pluses in regulating digital markets efficiency as (1) price model is irrelevant; (2) there is no 
sufficient effects-based approach; (3) there is a risk of protecting competitors rather competition; 
(4) there is no ‘safe harbour’ incorporated in the Commission’s Guidance; (5) there is no efficient 
method to assess interdependency in two-sided platforms; (6) it is time consuming to define the 
relevant market. Furthermore, it gives an answer to a research question that EU competition law, 
in particular Article 102 TFEU is effective in regulating digital markets to low extent. Finally, it 
recommends to increase effectivity of Article 102 TFEU in regulating digital markets, namely, to 
enforce Article 102 TFEU by supplementation of sector-specific regulation, broaden definition of 
consumer welfare, rethink the standard of proof, impose timeframe, not to focus on defining the 
relevant market, integrate error-cost test and place attention to consumers biases.  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INTRODUCTION 
The current topic is changing the view on the traditional world. The digital era has brought 
innovation and technologies in daily interactions within businesses and social processes. 
“Digitisation has fundamentally altered the way data is generated, stored, processed, exchanged 
and distributed.”  The data and information are now more accessible from every part of the world 1
with an emergence of the Internet. The free services, such as communication, has greatly 
benefited society and economy together. The consumer choice is expanded in terms of free access 
to diverse sources. Digitalization shows how the timeliness of bypassing the problems in many 
situations is decreasing. It now fosters the development in all industries staring from information 
technology to financial services and healthcare. Along the online network, the digitalization has 
come with an advanced economic models. Thus, “Digitisation requires profound organizational 
changes in firms and public services in order to yield the gains in productivity it promise.”  For 2
example, to train the employees to use certain technology or device. Furthermore, the concerns of 
digitalization involves the significant supremacy by some of the digital environments and 
platforms, “…by the end of September 2018, the first largest firms in the world by market 
capitalization were in the digital sector, namely Apple, Amazon, Microsoft and Alphabet.”   3
It leads to the research issue of the present paper, which deals with the new emerging 
standards, productive innovation by digital sector companies and the effective regulation by 
European Union Competition law. The research issue lies in hypothesis that the current 
framework of EU competition law is not fully appropriate for the regulation of digital markets. 
Namely, whether or not it is effective, and if no, then how the competition law could be 
enhanced, “…whether – and if so which type of – regulation is needed.”   4
 Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer. Competition Policy for the Digital Era. 1
(Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019), p. 12, accessed April 29, 2019, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf.
 Ibid.2
 Ibid., p. 13.3
 Ibid., p. 14.4
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The issue is embodied in Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union  (TFEU) which states 5
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in 
so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.  6
Yet, reflecting the issue, the Bachelor Thesis focuses primarily on Article 102 (d) TFEU where it 
emphasizes the prohibition of “…making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance …
which…have no connection with the subject of such contracts.”  7
Thus, the following Research Question for the Bachelor Thesis is: “To what extent EU 
competition law, in particular Article 102 TFEU is effective in regulating digital markets?” 
The aim of this research paper is to evaluate whether EU competition law is effective in 
regulating digital markets, additionally whether it should be supplemented by more efficient 
tools, tests, etc. 
Part I focuses on describing Article 102 TFEU, its characteristics in assessing the 
anticompetitive effects and resulting issues of investigation process, Part II brings about the 
analysis of multi-sided markets and presents the Google Android case as a subject matter to such 
markets, Part III emphasizes the problem at stake involved in Article 102 (d) TEFU leading to an 
example of Microsoft v. Commission  case and finally Part VI proposes a findings on mitigating 8
the matter.  
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version 2012), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012. Available 5
on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT. Accessed April 2, 2019.
 Ibid. 6
 Ibid. 7
 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European 8
Communities, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289.
"7
The Bachelor Thesis is examined by using primary and secondary EU law, in particular, 
Article 102 TFEU, an emphasis placed on its application in EU competition enforcement, 
including the European Commission’s decisions, the Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 102 TFEU , CJEU case law and lastly other legal scholarly writings 9
and documents accompanied by economic papers consisting of economic concepts without which 
the analysis of EU competition law would not be feasible. 
PART I - ARTICLE 102 TFEU  
The beginning of Article 102 TFEU is found in 1957 when 6 original founding Member States 
signed the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty). The main 
article was 86 EEC and it prohibited an abuse of dominant position. Historically, Article 86 EEC 
was changed to Article 82 EC and then to Article 102 TFEU which is now operating for more 
than 60 years. In general, the inspiration when drafting this article were German competition law, 
European Coal and Steal Community Treaty and the source which is underestimated was United 
States antitrust law. Article 102 TFEU is not based only on rights and obligations but also “…
reflects a number of the underlying political, legal, economic, and social objectives of the EC 
Treaty.”  It has been extensively interpreted, especially in the last decade. The reform in the 10
enforcement of Article 102 TFEU focuses on covering the gaps through bringing theories of harm 
and being closer with economic analysis. Nowadays, the influencer of such development of 
Article 102 TFEU is mainly the digital age. 
“Article 102 is designed to deal with monopoly and substantial market power.”  It 11
manages the unilateral behavior by an undertaking rather than agreements between undertakings, 
as Article 101 TFEU does. It applies only to dominant undertakings and prohibits them to abuse a 
dominant position. Article 102 TFEU does not apply to undertakings that reach a dominant 
 European Commission, “Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 9
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings,” Official Journal of the European Union C 45 
Volume 52, No. 2 (2009): pp. 7-20, accessed April 3, 2019, available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01).
 Robert O’Donoghue and Atilano Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Oxford: Hart 10
Publishing, 2013), chap. 2.1.
 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (New York, NY: Oxford 11
University Press, 2016), p. 258.
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position by anti-competitive conduct or non-dominant firms. It prohibits undertakings to take an 
advantage form dominant position by imposing unfair prices, limiting production etc. The case 
law suggests that “…the provision also covers anti-competitive conduct by which a dominant 
undertaking excludes actual or potential competitor from the market.”  It is known as 12
‘exclusionary’ conduct. The application of Article 102 TFEU by competition authorities, courts is 
usually disputed because of 
(1) contentious assessment whether an undertaking is dominant; 
(2) attention is focused on the form of the behavior, not its effects; 
It has often been applied in a formalistic way, focusing on the form of the conduct and 
drawing presumptions from that, rather than analyzing the actual effects on the market.  13
(3) no clear policy objectives as “Article 102 itself is silent on its precise objective(s) and the test 
of ‘abuse' not stipulated therein.”  14
In general, Article 102 TFEU has a prohibitive nature. “Article 102 TFEU prohibits 
undertakings from committing an abuse of dominant position…”  The examples of abuses are 15
stated in paragraphs (a) to (d), but the list is not exhaustive, thus the specific types of abuses are 
not listed. “The provision does not set out a separate procedure for declaring an undertaking to be 
dominant and so subject to Article 102.”  It is deemed to have a dominant position if it matches 16
the benchmark for dominance and has potential to depend on prohibition. Article 102 TFEU 
contains no exceptions. “…it is settled case law that no exemption of any kind may be granted in 
respect of abuse of a dominant position.”  But an undertaking is allowed to show that its conduct 17
is ‘objectively justified’. And there is no de minimis threshold with respect to assessing the 
‘substantial part’ and the ‘effect on inter-State trade’. In general there are following essential 
features that must be established before the prohibition of Article 102 TFEU applies: 
 Ibid. 12
 Ibid., p. 257.13
 Pinar Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches (London: 14
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), p. 1.
 Jones and Sufrin, supra note 11, p. 259.15
 Ibid. 16
 Lorenzo Federico Pace, European Competition Law: The Impact of the Commission's Guidance on Article 102 17
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), p. 113.
"9
(a) one or more undertakings; 
(b) a dominant position; 
(c) the dominant position must be held within the internal market or a substantial part of 
it; 
(d) an abuse; and 
(e) an effect on inter-State trade.  18
“The application of Article 102 TFEU…entails merely one phase, namely the determination of 
whether an undertaking has abused its dominant position.”  The problematic features are 19
assessing the dominant position and the abuse. The dominant position makes it challenging for 
the Commission to establish the market definition, undertaking’s position on the market. It is 
possible that if the investigation is not concluded correctly, the mistake of pro-competitive 
behavior that is subject to Article 102 TFEU prohibition may arise. It is know as Type 1 ‘false 
positive error’. Assessing whether an undertaking is abuses its power can also create challenges. 
It is needed to determine what conduct of a dominant undertaking is allowed and what conduct is 
not legitimate. Thus, it depends on Article 102 TFEU wholly, which has no clear objectives, “…
lack of clarity about the goals to be achieved will inevitably lead to inconsistent decisions.”  20
Finally, there is a tendency to integrate both elements, not separately assessed.  
The cases on abuse of dominance often start from complaints, usually competitors of an 
undertaking at stake. The Commission introduces the case right after the complaint has been 
passed. It is “…noticeable in the high technology sector, with the Commission opening 
investigations, for example, after complaints from Microsoft about Google…”  Where the 21
Commission investigates an undertaking and finds it breaching Article 102 TFEU, the 
Commission issues a decision. It is usually accompanied by imposing fines up to 10 % of the 
annual turnover of an undertaking, as it will be disused in relation with Google Android case. It 
can compel an abuse to be stopped and, where necessary, impose a behavioral or structural 
remedy. Under Regulation 1/2003 , Article 9, the completion of the case can be made through 22
 Jones and Sufrin, supra note 15.18
 Pace, supra note 17, p. 114.19
 Akman, supra note 14, p. 51.20
 Jones and Sufrin, supra note 11, p. 261.21
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 22
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4 January 2003, pp. 1–25.
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commitments decision. In this case, an undertaking is offering commitments, which are accepted 
by the Commission. The Commission is using this option frequently, however it has a negative 
impact on development of Article 102 TFEU as “…it is never established whether…conduct did 
amount to an infringement of Article 102…the matter never goes before the EU courts.”  23
The decisions of the Commission is usually very complex in terms of facts. It makes it 
challenging for the court to review the Commission’s decisions. Thus, the judicial review is not 
the strongest part of the whole process. “Many of the Commission’s decisions are controversial…
and the extent to which they are reviewed by the GC is therefore of great concern.”  However, 24
lately the General Court accepted to use the in-depth analysis more. Additionally, “…it is very 
rare for the Commission to lose Article 102 cases on the substance.”       25
1. The concept of ‘dominant position’ and ‘abuse' 
The definition of dominance is clarified in United Brands , the Court of Justice stated that 26
dominant position is “…a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which 
enables it to prevent effective competition…by affording it…to behave…independently…”  In 27
Hoffmann-La Roche , the Court of Justice added that the dominant undertaking has an “…28
influence on the conditions under which that competition will develop…”  The notion ‘behave 29
independently’ brings uncertainty to Article 102 TFEU application as it is debated whether it is a 
separate element form notion ‘prevent effective competition’.  
Furthermore, the dominant position is measured directly or indirectly. The competition 
law assesses it indirectly through establishing market definition and undertaking’s position on the 
specific market. “Dominance relates to an undertaking’s market power on a particular market and 
 Jones and Sufrin, supra note 21.23
 Jones and Sufrin, supra note 11, p. 262.24
 Ibid.25
 Judgment of the Court of 14 February 1978, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v 26
Commission of the European Communities, 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22.
 Ibid., para. 65.27
 Judgment of the Court of 13 February 1979, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European 28
Communities, 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36.
 Ibid., para. 39.29
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not to the size of the market or the size of the firm.”  The market definition is used to answer 30
whether an undertaking is dominant. The wider is market, the fewer chances to find a dominance 
in it, thus it is relevant to define it. 
In respect to the relevant product market, the Commission uses Small but Significant 
Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test to define the market. It is a quantitive method to 
asses whether the consumers will substitute the product with another if the first product’s price is 
increased by 5-10 %. However, the test is problematic in application to digital markets. It will be 
discuss in more detail in next parts. In general “The usual way of assessing dominance is 
problematic in some new economy markets.”  31
With regard to relevant geographic market, it can be found that there are national markets 
or narrow markets. National markets are usually one or more European Union Member States. 
On  the other hand,  
Narrow geographic markets may be created through factors such as EU regulation, high 
transport costs, language, marketing infrastructures, consumer preference, or national or 
local regulations.  32
Sometimes, the over-narrowly defined geographic markets are misleading, but it can be made 
better if the external competition of the market is considered. Additionally, the market definition 
and assessment of market power are dealt ‘hand in hand’ with each other. 
Statutory monopoly of an undertaking tells automatically that the undertaking is 
dominant, however if it not the case, the first step is to assess the market shares. The market 
power is assessed through the market share of an undertaking and barriers to entry. “…in the 
absence of barriers to entry high market shares are not themselves indicative of dominance.”  33
Barriers to entry encompasses that competitors are unable to entry or expand in the market, for 
example high switching costs indicate that the consumer is unwilling to charge the supplier. 
Market shares present a current situation of the market. Even if a firm has a market share of 
100% it does not mean that it has a substantial power in a market. However, a firm which has a 
 Jones and Sufrin, supra note 11, p. 268.30
 Ibid., p. 284.31
 Ibid., p. 312.32
 Ibid., p. 321.33
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market share of more than 50% is usually considered dominant. But it is also possible that the 
undertaking is dominant if the market share is, for example, 40%. It is not clear at which point an 
undertaking is dominant. Moreover, "The Guidance Paper does not establish a safe ‘ harbour’.”  34
The issue holds that “…market share analysis is 'static' and not suited for application to 
dynamically competitive markets such as those in the new economy.”  35
In Hoffman-La Roche, an abuse was considered as “…behaviour of an undertaking in a 
dominant position…where…the degree of competition is weakened… hindering the…growth of 
that competition.”  There are exclusionary and exploitative abuses. The former means that an 36
undertaking hinders or slows the competition by excluding competitors, the latter involves an 
undertaking that is exploiting its market participants, for example, limiting production. There are 
also discriminatory abuses, for example, charging discriminatory prices. Also, there is a long-
term harm and short-term harm on welfare. The former occurs when “…the abuse prevents the 
entrant from becoming as efficient as the dominant undertaking…”  The abuse is also defined as  37
…conduct that does not amount to “competition on the merits” - that is by lower prices 
and better products, the “special responsibility” of a dominant firm not to restrain any 
remaining competition…  38
However, the competition on merits is not definite as “…great deal of uncertainty exists 
regarding the relative merits…”  The Guidance Paper introduces a concept of anti-competitive 39
foreclosure effects, which includes exclusion of competitors and harm to consumers. “Article 102 
TFEU has mainly been applied to ‘exclusionary abuses’, i.e. to conduct which impedes effective 
competition by excluding (foreclosing) competitors.”  For example, one type of exclusionary 40
abuse is ‘tying’ and it is controversial to perceive it as an abuse, which will be discussed in later 
stages of this research paper.  
 Jones and Sufrin, supra note 31. 34
 Jones and Sufrin, supra note 33.35
 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, supra note 28, para. 91.36
 Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 37
102 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 149.
 Padilla, supra note 10, chap. 2.4. 38
 Ibid.39
 Jones and Sufrin, supra note 13. 40
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2. Issues of Article 102 TFEU 
The traditional and new economy cases are both operating under a concept of effective 
competition. “Effective competition connotes the idea that firms are subject to a reasonable 
degree of competitive constraint.”  At some point the effective competition is at doubt. As 41
Article 102 TFEU is effectively dealing with an abuse of dominance in standard cases, such as to 
supply a competitor, it has its drawbacks as well, specifically in connection with fast developing 
digital industry and rapidly changing economic conditions. Tech companies are becoming the 
rulers of innovation, subsequently Article 102 TFEU, nowadays, is viewed not capable of 
effectively dealing with tech firm cases anymore. For example, one of the most significant tech 
trends is digital platform, which importance is increasing rapidly over the past few years. It 
leaves EU competition law enforcement under challenge at the moment and underlines the 
potential issues in the future.  
In general, the challenge for competition policy remains under the question due to the 
relatively new industry of computer network, Internet and its development, in particular, is it 
possible for competition law to successfully integrate along the digitalized era and “…protect 
consumers without causing harm from interfering in complex businesses that are both rapidly 
moving and not fully understood.”  Some legal researchers suggest that intervening by 42
competition policy in the digital platforms may cause costly mistakes. “Economic complexity…
coupled with an insufficiently deferential approach to innovative technology…portend a 
potentially erroneous—and costly—result.”  It is criticized that competition enforcement 43
interferes with healthy economic management and has provisional economic costs due to over-
enforcement and under-enforcement. As it is hard to evaluate the abusive behavior by 
undertaking in digital platform market “…the likelihood of over-enforcement is high.”  Over-44
enforcement can cause a long-term issues for financial prosperity because such errors can 
 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 18. 41
 Howard A. Shelanski, “Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet,” 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1663 42
(2013): p. 1666, accessed March 28, 2019, available on: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol161/
iss6/6. 
 Geoffrey A. Manne, and Joshua D. Wright, “Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Antitrust 43
Case Against Google,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 34, No. 1, (2011): p. 172, accessed March 29, 
2019, available on: https://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2013/10/ManneFinal.pdf.
 Shelanski, supra note 42. 44
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discourage innovation and investment. However, under-enforcement can have consequences in 
short-term, where the market balances itself. As Shelanski suggests , there is a dissonance 45
between innovative tech companies with their approach for establishing a competition operating 
in digital industry and the price or traditional model on the other hand when enforcing 
competition. Tech companies having digital platforms and providing their technology to the 
public domains are not easy to characterize and they are less likely to match with the traditional 
assumptions of competition law. For example, the innovative companies do not offer their 
product for money but focus on creating competition with their innovative technologies, such as 
Google offering its pre-installed apps on mobile devices through agreements with manufactures 
and mobile network operators. Such price model would not be necessary in this case. 
Furthermore, as the price model is ‘static' rather than competition in tech industry which 
is driven by innovation and progressive technologies, Shelanski emphasizes the Schumpeterian 
argument  that tech firms are known to have an innovation cycles, which is their nature how to 46
make progress. If there is an interference of competition enforcement into this industry and 
innovation cycles, it can have negative impact on the market and it can chill the innovation down.  
The crucial disadvantage lies in the application of Article 102 TFEU that is much 
criticized for having a basis of per se rule. It means that the attention is put on the actions of the 
undertakings but not the competition itself. It is contradictory to the functioning of market taking 
into account the economic practices. The application of the law by CJEU is more formalistic than 
it should be and “…is excessively based on per se rules that do not allow the net effects of the 
market practices on welfare to be correctly taken into account.”  The broad economic practice is 47
reasoned by the per se rules and usually the likely abuse of the undertaking is found irrespective 
of the actual or potential economic influence on the competition. For example, in Michelin , the 48
 Ibid., p.1667. 45
 Michael L. Katz and Howard A. Shelanski, “ ‘Schumpeterian’ Competition and Antitrust Policy in High-Tech 46
Markets,” Competition, Vol. 14, (2005): p. 4, accessed March 27, 2019, available on: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=925707.
 Frédéric Marty, “Towards an economics of convention-based approach of the European competition policy,” 47
Historical Social Research 40 (2015): p. 106, accessed March 29, 2019, available on: http://dx.doi.org/10.12759/hsr.
40.2015.1.94-111.
 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 30 September 2003, Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin 48
v Commission of the European Communities, T-203/01, ECLI:EU:T:2003:250. 
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court said that “…it is apparent from a consistent line of decisions that a loyalty rebate…is 
contrary to Article 82 EC.”  However, lately the CJEU tried to improve its position with regard 49
to per se illegality. For example, the notable step was made by the European Commission in 2005 
when it “…issued a comprehensive discussion paper which rejected the former legalistic straight-
jacked approach in favour of an effects-based approach.”  In Intel, the CJEU emphasized 50
effects-based approach as the examination of facts in this case was carried out more detailed, “…
Commission…carried out an in-depth examination…setting out…a very detailed analysis…”  It 51
is observed that the situation is slightly improving and EU competition law application is moving 
towards effect based approach rather than form based, however some legal writers, such as Diker 
Vanberg believe that “…such reform was rather ambiguous and inadequate for incorporating 
efficiencies.”  52
Article 102 TFEU directs that the undertaking which is considered to be dominant has “…
a special responsibility not to allow its behavior to impair genuine undistorted competition on the 
common market…”  It means that such undertakings are put under a disadvantage, because they 53
are performing the same actions as other companies but they alone will be considered as 
worsening the competition. For example, Google Android is tying apps and its competitors are 
doing the same, but only Google is doing it illegally. In a such way, the law cares about the 
competitors and not the competition. It also points out that Article 102 TFEU is directing at the 
competitors of the dominant firm and not the consumers, “…criticism of Commission practice is 
that it sometimes runs the risk of protecting competitors at the expense of competition.”  In the 54
opinion of the assistant Attorney General for the Department's Antitrust Division 
 Ibid., para. 56. 49
 Competition Competence Report. More economics based approach in Article 102 TEFU: New test procedures, p. 50
1. Available on: https://www.ee-mc.com/fileadmin/user_upload/ccr_en/New_tests_Article_102.pdf. Accessed April 
25, 2019. 
 Judgment of the Court of 6 September 2017, Intel Corp. v European Commission, C-413/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:51
2017:632, para. 142. 
 Diker A. Vanberg, “From Archie to Google -Search engine providers and emergent challenges in relation to EU 52
competition law,” European Journal for Law and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2012): chap. 4, accessed April 3, 2019, 
available on: http://ejlt.org/article/view/115/198.
 Judgment of the General Court of 1 July 2010, AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission, 53
T-321/05, ECLI:EU:T:2010:266, para. 379. 
 Padilla, supra note 38.54
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…the standard applied…by the CFI, rather than helping consumers, may have the 
unfortunate consequence of harming consumers by chilling innovation and discouraging 
competition.   55
In addition, the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 TFEU in itself is directing to the 
likeliness of the harm and is not describing the actual harm. For example, the guidelines refer to 
the “…the allegedly abusive conduct is likely to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure.”  Thus, it 56
is not linking the actual harm of the particular undertaking which is foreclosing its competitors 
with unfavorable effect on consumer prosperity. The notion of ‘compete on merits’ is not a 
definite explanation “…it is not…illegal for an undertaking to be in a dominant position and such 
a dominant undertaking is entitled to compete on the merits.”  It means that the Commission is 57
not drawing the limits on competition boundaries of the undertaking and can take uncertain 
measures to deal with an abuse of dominance cases. In the end, there is no guidance on the 
interpretation when weighting the case effects. The Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 TFEU 
does not have sufficient grounds to consider whether articular practice by undertaking is abusive. 
Undertakings cannot really be guided by the Guidance because there are many exceptions made 
and it makes it hard to evaluate the case and determine the possible protection clearly. Moreover, 
Article 102 TFEU can be interpreted in many ways because it has a comprehensive formulation 
in that way increasing the level of ambiguity. 
PART II - MULTI-SIDED MARKETS 
Multi-sided markets are also called ‘platforms’, where two or more interdependent groups 
interact to share the benefits. 
See Appendix No. 1: Multi-sided platform 
Many small firms try to establish a multi-sided market. Any mistakes while trying to 
make a multi sided market are covered by the profits of it later. Multi-sided markets are not 
linear. It means that it is very attractive to build such a network because the value of it comes not 
 Department of Justice. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, available on: https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/55
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only from each part of the platform separately but much more than that. As Esko Kilpi suggests 
“…there is an ever-widening gap between the network-economy platforms and incumbents 
driven by traditional asset leverage models.”  It requires strong knowledge and skills in order to 58
make it work successfully. For example, if the employer is contacting the potential employee 
through LinkedIn, it has a multi-sided effect on this communication. There are many more multi-
sided market, such as Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook or Google etc. The question of 
whether Google is a multi-sided platform will be addressed in the next paragraphs.  
In digital sector almost every platform is multi-sided, which gives rise to a more 
progressive industry. The competition among digital companies occur when they are “…
integrating multiple platforms and creating synergies by linking them through user data.”  As the 59
counterparts of the platform are interdependent, it creates a challenge for the competition 
authorities to assess the interdependency rather than each part separately. “There is a risk that 
competition authorities analyze two sides of one platform but subsequently ignore relationships 
with other platform markets.”  However, there are more challenges to overcome. Firstly, when 60
assessing the dominance of an undertaking there are issues in defining the relevant market 
because there could be more relevant markets at the same time, where the product is functioning. 
There are transaction markets and non-transaction markets. The latter means that “…a product 
competes on one side of the market, but not the other.”  Thus, in a non-transaction markets there 61
should be defined more than one relevant market. For example, in the Google Android case the 
Commission’s decision states that there are three relevant markets 
Google is dominant in the markets for general internet search services, licensable smart 
mobile operating systems and app stores for the Android mobile operating system.  62
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 Secondly, referring to the part about issues of Article 102 TFEU, the usage of the price model in 
tech industry companies makes it difficult to characterize the market and competition restrictions, 
thus it is questionable way how to assess it because in most cases tech companies are offering 
their products for free. Usually there are two sides of the platform form which one is financed 
whereas the other side pays for the services, “…one side usually pays nothing to use the platform. 
This is a mainstream strategy in multisided markets to…generate revenues.”  In particular, “…63
one side of a platform is charged less than the other, often even charged at zero prices.”  If there 64
are no prices then it “…could lead to the view that there is no market at all to investigate on that 
side.”  Due to defining the relevant market, there is a (SSNIP) test carried out, which  65
…assesses the extent to which the customers of a product in question would switch to 
suppliers located in other territories in response to a hypothetical small but permanent 
increase in price of that given product.  66
It is believed that such test does not apply in multi-sided markets because the product does not 
have a price and “…the application of the SSNIP test…cannot be usefully applied to one side of 
the platform in isolation.”  To produce innovative products, multi-sided markets should have a 67
huge investment, usually in Research and Development category, thus they  “…have high fixed 
or sunk costs and low marginal costs of production…”  The SSNIP test applied in multi-sided 68
markets would result in false assumptions, specifically “…it may lead to incorrect, particularly 
over-narrow, definitions.”  That is why it is suitable only in one-sided markets in respect to the 69
digital industry. Similarly, the critical loss analysis (CLA) has the same issues. However, in the 
application of EU competition law, the two tests SSNIP and CLA, could be used only with 
significant modifications. Thirdly, there is a challenge for competition authorities in the lengthy 
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process of defining a relevant market. More specifically, the Commission can achieve a static 
view on it, however tech firms are developing quickly and the innovation can change very fast, in 
turn the relevant market can change fast as well because there are more and more markets 
involved. It is called a ‘fluid market boundaries’. With such a changing nature it is hard to gain 
control over fast evolving market boundaries and hold them within the static laws. Keeping in 
mind those expectations about two-two-sided markets, many legal writers believe that the 
standard laws are not well balanced with highly innovative digital sector. According to Evans 
(2003) and Wauthy (2008)  
…standard antitrust principle…need to be adapted to deal with two-sided markets where 
there are strong interactions between each side of the markets.  70
For example, Google has strong links among its business participants. The Google Android case 
presents a set of different market sides such as device manufacturers, mobile network operators, 
app developers, consumers and Google itself. Stylianou calls it a 'systematic efficiencies’ which 
“…occur in large complex systems through the interaction of multiple distributed components… 
coordinated by an entity that can exercise pervasive control…”  Thus, the sides participating in 71
the multi-sided market can gain benefits from each other. In other words build collaborations. 
The balance between the benefits of systematic efficiencies and possible anticompetitive behavior 
of the company should be coordinated carefully, in fact the anticompetitive behavior must not be 
outweighed by the benefits because there is a conflict between these two. “The conflict between 
the large benefits that arise from systemic efficiencies and the large losses that result from 
potentially anticompetitive acts…”  In this respect, the Google Android case is a good example 72
of systematic efficiencies developed by Google and a device manufacturers. The situation is that 
Google requires manufacturers to pre-install its suite if apps on devices only if the manufacturers 
sign the MADA, so it is optional. Other manufacturers can put Android devices in the market 
with other pre-installed apps. It is also true about Google approving the Android forks before they 
can enter the market. As Stylianou suggests “…a unified update process speeds up the 
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dissemination of new features and facilitates testing and error detection.”  It happens only for the 73
sake of benefits, not only by Google but also other participants in the chain. 
Apart from defining the relevant market, there are difficulties in assessing the firm’s 
dominance in line with its market power. If there are inaccuracies in defining the relevant market 
of the multi-sided company, there will be also errors in assessing the dominance. Moreover, if the 
relevant market is defined correctly, the dominant position to assess in digital sector is still 
challenging. The dominance is determined by competition authority assessing the market power 
in the first place using “…quantitative indicators such as concentration ratios, market shares, 
price levels, or profit margins to determine market power.”  Specifically, the “…market shares…74
can be calculated on the basis of their sales of the relevant products in the relevant area.”  The 75
Court states a 50 % market share is indicative of a dominant position 'except in exceptional 
circumstances’.  In that case the firm has a special responsibility not to abuse its dominant 76
position. It means that companies with high market shares are prohibited from competing with 
other companies on the same level as others.  
As the tech firms usually compete on the level of technology rather than price and offer 
the products for free, some firms making almost no profit, it is very hard to determine the 
dominance using the static factors listed above. That is why it is not efficient for the Commission 
and CJEU to assess the tech sector firm’ s power by using the market share indicator. 
Overall, referring to the case of Google Android investigated by the Commission, which 
is the  most important antitrust case at the moment, the question is whether Google is functioning 
in a multi-sided market, because it is one of the main tech driver companies, which keeps their 
development rapid. 
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According to Luchetta , a multi-sided market is an economic circumstance and it occurs 77
where two separate groups of users are bonded on a platform and they create reciprocal cross-side 
network externalities for each other. The two classes of users are advertisers and searchers and 
network externalities are to be understood as ability of searchers and advertisers to realize gains 
when interacting on a platform. In this case Luchetta argues that Google cannot be considered as 
a two-sided platform pursuant to the definition stated above because “…for most of the queries 
performed on Google, inter-side positive network externalities from advertisers to users are 
absent or at best negligible.”  Moreover, Luchetta emphasizes that it is “…a business strategy 78
and not a structural feature of the market.”  In addition, Luchetta believes that there are two 79
transactions occurring on a platform instead of single one. It means that the searchers are 
searching for information on Google platform, while advertisers are looking for the users 
attention, “…the two transactions are not the two parts of a single interaction…”  The writer 80
claims that the advertisers can benefit form the searchers, but the searchers do not gain any 
network externalities from advertisers. In general, Google can be considered as a non-
transactional multi sided market or it is not a multi sided market at all. However, this view is 
much criticized.  
Many scholars, Evans and Schmalensee and others, believe that the Google platform is 
operating on a two-sided market because “…there is a self-reinforcing loop between the number 
of searchers and advertisers…”  Evans claims that there are three groups of forces, namely, web-81
sites, searchers and advertisers that benefit from the search engine. He describes them as  
(1) websites that are indexed and made available to people through search queries; (2) 
people making search queries; and (3) advertisers who are seeking to reach the people 
who are looking at the search-results page from the query.  82
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Furthermore, all three groups are interacting and through generating positive network 
externalities, for example if the business decisions by Google are changing, it will influence one 
group and this one group will affect the other groups. That is why there is ‘self-reinforcing loop’. 
Evans is explaining this interconnection as the platform seeking attention of searchers to provide 
the advertisers with it. As an example is serving the previous case with Microsoft, where its 
platform was also considered as multi-sided “…serving end users, developers who write 
applications, and hardware makers.”  All three components were connected through network 83
externalities and Windows platform had “…a critical mass of customers on all three sides, and 
each group had made investments in the platform.”  84
In this view, Google is operating on a two-sided market because there are positive 
externalities on the Android platform between the “…handset manufacturers, users, mobile 
operators, and software developers…”85
1. Characteristics of the digital market 
1.1. Innovation 
The most recognizable feature of the digital industry is innovation. It is an integral part with 
which the search engines are operating in order to survive in the market. To transcend 
technologies of Google the new entrant should have a higher level of innovation and new 
technologies to offer, to “… demonstrate and sustain a level of innovation which is higher than 
current industry standards…”  Furthermore, the high tech firms are required to invest in the 86
development of innovation because “Competition in the New Economy is driven by investment 
and innovation.”  The innovation is necessary not only to improve the technologies but also to 87
reduce costs of production, thus in most cases the firms are transforming themselves or the 
market is shifted to creation of the new ones. The consumer benefits depend on the cost reduction 
as the “…competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, 
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the new organization…commands a decisive cost or quality advantage.”  Despite the positive 88
effects on consumer welfare, the high growth of the digital industry challenges the competition 
authorities in assessing that market.  
1.2. Network effects  
The most important characteristic of the multi-sided platform is network effects or demand side 
economies of scale, also called as arising ‘network externalities’. In general, the more users use 
the platform, the higher the value of the platform. It makes it influential because when 
investigating the antitrust case, assessing the multi-sided digital platform with strong, mostly 
indirect network externalities (INE) play a decisive role in defining the market power. Evans 
suggests  that antitrust authorities should adjust their tools in analyzing the market power of a 89
multi-sided firm. Further strengthening the point, Lam finds that one-sided analysis avoids 
analyzing, for example, switching costs and “Policies that ignore these effects may overestimate 
the extent to which switching costs can reduce welfare.”  To clarify, there are two types of 90
network effects: indirect and direct network effects. Direct network effects emerge when the users 
of a product directly contact. For example, “…a social network: a larger numbers of users 
increases its utility for users.”  However, the indirect network effect occurs due to massive usage 91
of the product which attracts outsiders and benefits the actual users of the product. For example, 
“… a fax machine: the more people that own such a machine, the more valuable it is as fax 
owners have more users to communicate with.”  The INE presents the two sides of the platform 92
that are interconnected and depend on each other. The benefit of the one part depends on the 
amount of users of the other part. The indirect network externalities are traveling to both parts of 
the platform and consecutively producing feedback loops between them, however it does not 
mean that the INE are certainly evenly powerful in respective sides. “The strength of these 
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feedback loops…should be taken into account in any assessment.”  In general, the network 93
effects are beneficial for the platforms and in turn they are generating the dominant market 
leaders and it is nothing unexpected. If there is a platform established, it should protect itself 
form the rivals by being different because the new competitors will compete with higher 
technologies. And the platform can be protected in the presence of competitor’s no-differentiation 
and the network effects on the platform. The network effects are also present on the platform of 
the search engine of Google as the larger the number of the searchers, the higher the value of the 
advertising platform, in turn the advertisers are receiving the benefits and it results in Google 
operating on a two-sided market.  
1.3. Economies of Scale 
Supply side economies of scale is well established concept which implies that a company is 
gaining an advantage due to saving in costs per unit while the production or output level is 
increasing. There is a difference between the demand side economies of scale or network affects 
and supply side because the former entails that the value of a product is increased for its users. 
The traditional sectors such as the process of car production or supermarkets buying in bulk 
benefit form economies of scale, however the relatively new industry of search engines bases the 
benefits on it as well. The industrial model of a search engine or the associated platform “…tend 
to rely on volume impact, distributing electronic content and services at low marginal cost and 
high unit margins.”  The digital markets relate to economies of scale as “…increased data from 94
users leads to more accurate search algorithms.”  As the network effects characterize the digital 95
platforms closely, those combined with economies of scale improve the quality of a product “…
meaning that the more users a search engine has the more accurate the results it produces.”  96
Moreover, if both are strong then the company usually has a huge market share and low marginal 
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costs resulting in monopoly. Google recognizes that “…economies of scale allow Google Apps to 
operate at higher levels of efficiency…”  97
1.4. High fixed and low marginal costs  
The digital sector firms have high fixed costs or sunk costs and low marginal costs. It is so 
because the tech sector requires a huge investment in R&D to produce innovative products or “…
investment is required in order to create a physical or virtual network to produce and distribute 
products.”  After these primary investments, the additional costs associated with reproducing the 98
product are insignificant. The search engine sector has such a nature, high fixed costs are used to 
develop the search engine itself and make it attractive to users, however the marginal costs of 
hosting an addition searchers and expanding are low. “The marginal cost for answering an 
additional search query and displaying an additional advertisement is close to zero.”  In the 99
search engine industry the fixed costs are linked with R&D expenses to continuously manage the 
platform and make progress to it, stay competitive as well. For example, in 2018 Google had 
spent over $16 Billions on Research and Development, which is roughly 15% of their 
revenues.  Nevertheless, the costs other than R&D arise from “…providing the hardware, 100
support, monitoring etc to keep a search engine running, responsive and up-to-date…in order to 
improve the service.”  The R&D and other associated costs are fixed and high, but costs of 101
hosting a new user, whether it is a searcher or an advertiser are marginal and low or almost zero. 
The search engine nature of division of costs on both sides therefore is compared to the 
monopoly situation.  
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1.5. Lock-In effects and Switching Costs 
“Switching costs are costs incurred by a user in moving from one product to another, such as exit 
charges, learning costs…”  In digital sector, in particular, the search engine industry and 102
platforms, there are no switching costs or they are low, because if consumers decide to switch to 
other platforms they can do it without difficulties. Despite the fact that enlarged switching costs 
are usually dominant in markets with substantial network effects, it is not the case with digital 
markets. As the digital market is known to have multi-homing feature, that is when “One or both 
sides of the market are present on multiple platforms,”  and it “May arise from competitive 103
sampling, product differentiation…” , the possibility of tipping is weakened. The sides of the 104
market are its users or app developers. It means that the user of a one platform is not prevented to 
use and promote to the value of other platform. In general, the users are free to participate in 
competing platforms and it is common in digital markets. Since the users can switch to the 
platforms they want without bearing the costs, there are no lock-in effects. However, there might 
be other sorts of costs, for example, loss of time or convenience. The digital companies as such 
are not dependent on price of the service, because they are offering services for free, it gains 
profits from ads. The Google Android platform entails that their users can switch to another 
operating systems easily, let it be Microsoft Windows phone or iPhone IOS. It implies that there 
are no switching costs and lock-in effects. 
1.6. Interoperability  
In the digital sector, the interoperability is a common characteristic. It is also called as 
compatibility thorough the digital firms.  
Interoperability is the ability of different information systems, devices or applications to 
connect, in a coordinated manner, within and across organizational boundaries to access, 
exchange and cooperatively use data.  105
Google has an Android Compatibility Definition Document (CDD) and it requires original 
equipment manufacturers (OEM’s) to follow various standards imposed by it. The CDD ensures 
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the interoperability for Android platform and among running Android applications. “The CDD 
thereby creates a stable platform for applications, both from Google and other Android based 
apps developers.”  In the CDD it is stated that the OEM’s are allowed to create Android forks or 106
substitute the Android apps with other apps based on a condition that they will follow the 
interoperability demands. Furthermore, the Microsoft and Google Android examples underline 
the importance of interoperability in the case law. In the Microsoft case the Commission stressed 
the abuse of dominance not only with regard to tying but also “…Microsoft had withheld 
essential interoperability information from its competitors…”  in that way restricting the 107
competitors ability to compete and producing innovative products. However, Google “…offers 
the whole Android code on a royalty-free, open source basis to every maker of mobile 
devices.”  Google, therefore, states the necessary information on interoperability in CDD to its 108
competitors, OEM’s and app developers. In general, from the above mentioned the “Google’s 
licensing practices…conform to the legally applicable standard regarding tying and 
interoperability requirements (even if…it were dominant).”  109
Google has also a "Mobile Application Distribution Agreement" (MADA) document, 
which has to be signed by OEM’s in order to get access to Google apps and offer them on devices 
running on Google’s Android or approved Android forks. But even if signing the MADA is not 
obligatory, the users are expecting the Android devices with pre-installed Google applications, 
thus it is more convenient for OEM’ to sigh it. 
The MADA furthermore improves interoperability of devices and apps throughout the 
Android ecosystem…helps to reduce the costs of app development to the advantage of app 
developers and consumers alike.  110
Overall, the advantages of ensuring interoperability among the digital industry are recognizable. 
The benefits are distributed both for the users of the devices and app developers. 
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2. The Google Android Case  
In 2018 the EU Commission fined Google 4.34 billion euros for an abusive practice, which aimed 
to strengthen Google’s search engine and breached EU competition law, Article 102 TFEU 
specifically. In the opinion of the Commission there are three abusive practices. First, Google “…
has required manufacturers to pre-install the Google Search app and browser app (Chrome)…”  111
in order for them to be able to get the licence for Google app store, which is the Play Store. 
Second, Google restricted manufactures from selling a smartphones which do not operate on 
Android and “…that were not approved by Google (so-called "Android forks”).”  in cases 112
where manufactures wanted to pre-install Google apps. And thirdly, particular manufactures were 
paid by Google in order to demand from them to only pre-install Google Search app. 
And what is important here is that the Commission and the Commissioner Margrethe 
Vestager see those breaches as a restrictions Google imposed on the Android manufacturers and 
other mobile network operators “…Google has imposed on Android device manufacturers and 
network operators to ensure that traffic on Android devices goes to the Google search 
engine…”  However, there is a much broader purpose of it. What Google’s Senior Vice 113
President and General Counsel Kent Walker is explaining is that the Commission is wrong about 
the fact that the Android does not compete with Apple’s iOS, he stresses “To ignore competition 
with Apple is to miss the defining feature of today’s competitive smartphone landscape.”  The 114
evidence for that can be found in the Commission Press release, which says that “Google's app 
store dominance is not constrained by Apple's App Store, which is only available on iOS 
devices.”  From Google’s point of view and survey held by Commission, where 89% people 115
surveyed responded are of opinion that Google and Apple are competing, it is not reasonable to 
say that they do not compete against each other.  
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The second point further gives explanation of three restrictions listed above in this part, 
the reasons of Commission to accuse Google of. It is know that “When Google develops a new 
version of Android it publishes the source code online.”  It means that third parties can 116
download  it and adjust the code and build the Android forks. Furthermore, this publicly available 
Android source code does not cover the Android apps owned by Google. If manufacturers want 
to gain an access to Android apps they have to open their relationship into agreements with 
Google, where in the decision by Google are listed three restrictions that Google put on those 
manufacturers who want to gain an access to the Android apps and services. Google agreed not 
only with device manufacturers but also particular mobile network operators where they agreed 
on the process of selling devices. Combining those three restrictions put forward, Commission 
believes that “These have enabled Google to use Android as a vehicle to cement the dominance 
of its search engine.”  However, what is again explained by Kent Walker is that while the 117
source code is publicly available and every manufacturer can download and change it, it is hard 
to establish and protect the Android from fragmentation issues because Android is unsafe against 
fragmentation. It is hard to “…ensure there’s a common, consistent version of the operating 
system, so that developers don’t have to go through the hassle and expense of building multiple 
versions of their apps.”  Undoubtedly, there should be work done in order to avoid it. Google is 118
working with hardware makers to ensure a bare minimum to keep compatibility thorough 
Android devices. Because of ensuring compatibility in the first place, device manufacturers are 
given a wide range of possibilities to make their phones, in other words “… wide latitude to build 
devices that go above that baseline..”  Google calls it as 'voluntary compatibility agreements' 119
rather than Commissions view on restrictions that Google put on those manufacturers. It is also 
supporting the app developers to make apps confidently that will work smoothly on many 
devices. In fact, it is other way around, “This balance stimulates competition between Android 
devices as well as between Android and Apple’s iPhone.”  Moreover, 94 % people surveyed by 120
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Commission are of opinion that Android platform is harmed due to fragmentation issue. If 
Commission desires to stop Google from entering into agreements with manufacturers and 
mobile network operators, restricting Google’s ability to balance compatibility among Android 
forks then fragmentation issue would be even worse, Android platform would be harmed and 
there would be worse competition among Android devices. 
Thirdly, the Commission is against the bundling of Google app store, Google Search app 
and browser app and supplying it to the manufacturers. It means that under this license system of 
Google manufacturers can have all three apps but not separately. They can pre-install all apps 
together. Commission is concerned about the possibility of users to download the Play Store 
legally, while manufacturers are of opinion that “Play Store is a "must-have" app, as users expect 
to find it pre-installed on their devices.”  The Commission divides this restriction into two 121
parts. One is tying of Google Search app and another of browser app. It found that 95 % of 
Android users search information using Google Search where it is pre-installed, while 75 % of 
Windows Mobile users search thought also pre-installed Microsoft Bing and 25% users download 
Google Search which is not pre-installed on Windows devices. The Commission suggests that 
Google in that way is decreasing the desire of manufacturers to pre-install other searching apps 
other than Google Search and furthermore is damaging the competitors ability to challenge 
Google. Commission ensures that  
Google achieves billions of dollars in annual revenues with the Google Play Store alone, it 
collects a lot of data that is valuable to Google's search and advertising business from 
Android devices, and it would still have benefitted from a significant stream of revenue 
from search advertising without the restrictions.  122
Apparently, here Commission answered its own question, because if Google still gets almost the 
same revenues with or without tying their apps and then it is clear that Google is not trying to 
abuse its dominant position in the market because there has to be a reason for it which is not put 
forward by Commission, Google is just making it simpler for manufacturers and the users to 
work with Android devices. Google’s general council again defends Google by saying that 
manufacturers are not compelled to pre-install any Google apps and that Google presents and 
offers a line of apps “…so that when you buy a new phone you can access a familiar set of basic 
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services…”  Most importantly, the Android’s competitors, such as Microsoft Windows or Apple 123
phones are also pre-installing a line of apps on their phones, specifically Microsoft Windows 
phones have 39 from 47 apps pre-installed and Apple’s iPhones have all apps pre-installed, while 
Android has 11 from 38. Thus, it is more than Google does. Also, Google allows “…hardware 
makers and carriers can pre-install rival apps right next to ours. In competition-speak, that means 
there’s no “foreclosure”.”  Kent Walker stresses that offering Google Search, browser app and 124
Play Store together is for free and it helps to avoid licensing fees. In general, the prices for 
manufacturers and users are reduced.  
Overall, it is clear that Android platform is a huge plus for Google’s image and ads, but 
the issue at stake for Commission remains that Google is restricting manufacturers and mobile 
network operators and restricting competition, while Google is defending and explaining the 
purpose of its actions, Google wants to reduce costs for app makers and device manufacturers, 
create stable devices and services. “An analysis of the effects of a specific type of conduct needs 
to take into account both pro and anti-competitive effects and resolve possible tradeoffs."  Since 125
the Android went to the market, phones become much cheaper and more accessible to people. 
Now, the app industry is booming the economy.  
PART III - ‘TYING' AND ‘BUNDLING’  
Tying or bundling encompasses two or more products offered by undertakings in one suite. There 
are three different ways of typing and bundling: pure bundling, mixed bundling and tying. The 
first occurs when acquiring two or more products is possible only in bundle, that is they are sold 
only together, thus it is not possible to purchase them separately. The second entails that the 
products are offered together, however the products are also available separately, but the buyers 
usually choose the products in bundle because it is financially cheaper. The third entails a case 
where the products are offered in bundle, however some of them are available for purchases 
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separately and some can be bought only in suite. As all three ways have the same idea, they are 
perceived similarly. 
The digital markets are very sensitive in antitrust cases in respect to tying and bundling in 
their businesses. “A practice that harms the competitive process may appear almost identical to 
one that constitutes vigorous and effective competition.”  As the digital markets are operating in 126
a ‘winner-takes-all’ economy, it is expected that they are safe against their rivals and their 
technologies, but Shapiro ensures that “…the information economy is populated by temporary 
monopolies…today’s leading technology…will…be toppled in short order by an upstart with 
superior technology.”  As an example, the iPhone iOS was released in 2007, Google Android in 127
2008, finally Microsoft released its windows mobile operating system two years later. Thus, it is 
observed that there are sequential effect on producing technologies. It is only logical if Microsoft 
Phone would have the superior technology as it was the last one to propose new technology, 
however it is not the case. The statistics show that on a global scale the Android has 75.33% of 
market share, iOS 22.4% and Windows 0.28% . These results might slightly differ due to the 128
regions with no information on the usage, but its clearly seen that the Android has the first 
position.  
Holzweber argues  that the ‘winner-takes-all’ creates barriers to entry and lower 129
incentives to innovate for others. It “… might transform a temporary monopoly into a stable 
monopoly which is not endangered of being toppled.”  Additionally, the typing and bundling is 130
at the case of lowering incentives to innovate making the company’s position in the market 
stable. Thus, it is beneficial for an undertakings to involve in typing and bundling process. 
The leverage theory of tying suggests that the dominant undertaking in one market might 
transfer or leverage its dominance to another market through tying one dominant product with 
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another product. In Google case, the EU Commission finds that Google is dominant in the 
markets of search engine (Google Search), mobile operating system (Android), distribution of 
applications for OS. The Commission claims that Google is transferring its power of dominant 
position in OS market through tying its applications and providing them in bundle for OEM’s to 
other markets, such as search market, where the Microsoft Bing is competing against Google. It 
means that the 
Tying allows the firm to attract consumers of the tied good market and…obtain the profit 
from the advertising side of the same market.  131
Consequently, EU Commission finds an abuse of dominant position by Google Android “…by 
forcing smartphone makers to pre-install its applications on Android devices in an all-or-nothing 
manner.”  132
According to Choiy and Jeon theory of levering of tying in a two sided markets , 133
Google is one of the such platforms. They suggested that the Google Play is serving as a 
dominant product and is a tying good, while the Google Search is the tied good where Google 
leverages its market power. Google offers the Google Play and Google Play Services in suite free 
of charge. As clarified by Etro and Caffarra, the purpose is “…to convince OEMs to adopt its OS 
…and persuade consumers to opt for Android devices. …”  134
The tying practices are included in the optional Mobile Application Distribution 
Agreement (MADA), where Google requires OEM’s to preinstall Google apps. According to the 
leaked version of MADA (2011) published by Ben Edelman  between Google and HTC 135
corporation there are rules which need to be signed by OEM’s. Paragraph 2.1. of leaked MADA 
states that  
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Devices may only be distributed if all Google Applications (excluding any Optional 
Google Applications) …are pre-installed on the Device, unless otherwise approved by 
Google in writing.  136
Paragraph 3.4. (4) of leaked MADA states that  
Google Phone-top Search must be set as the default search provider for all Web search 
access points on the Device. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are no placement 
requirements for Optional Google Applications.  137
Eric Schmidt, at that time a Chairman of Google, wrote that 
Manufacturers can choose to pre-install Google applications on Android devices,...but 
they can also choose to pre-install competing search applications like Yahoo! and 
Microsoft Bing.  138
Kovacevich mentioned that “…it is “ not true” that Android manufacturers must make Google 
Search the default.”  Google confirms that the OEM’s are not restricted to place other rival apps 139
next to the Google apps, moreover they can choose whether to place Google apps at all. 
Manufacturers are free to set Google apps and rival apps in a mixed way.  
According to EU competition law, tying practices are considered as an infringements 
when 
(i) the company concerned is dominant in the tying market; (ii) the tying and tied goods 
are two distinct products; (iii) the tying practice is likely to have a market distorting 
foreclosure effect; (iv) the tying practice is not justified objectively or by efficiencies.  140
EU competition law refers to tying and bundling in Article 102 (d) TFEU. It is observed that the 
law remained unchanged since it was created, nonetheless re-interpreted many times. The 
legislators are unable to keep up with the rising issues of digitalization “…requiring judges to 
apply legal doctrines which were originally conceived for the analogue world and thereby 
modifying them.”  Furthermore, “…competition concepts made up for the brick-and-mortar 141
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economy needed to be broadened in order to cope with Google…”  The emerging digitalization 142
era is the reason why the concept of tying and bundling is expanded “… hardly any doctrine of 
competition law was broadened more markedly with the advent of the internet economy…”  143
1. The Microsoft Case 
The case on the tying issue Microsoft v. Commission started back in 1998 when the Commission 
received a complaint by Sun Microsystems against Microsoft and reached its end in near 2007 
when the Court of First Instance upheld the Commission’s decision to impose a fine with an 
amount of €497 million. The complaint was based on a fact that the Microsoft refused to present 
the compatibility information to other competitors and they could not make secure that their 
products were compatible with the Microsoft operating system ‘Windows’. Moreover, the 
Commission investigated the tying practices of the Microsoft and viewed it as an abusive 
behavior.  
The decision was based mainly on two abusive practices: 
1) “…the refusal to supply and authorise the use of interoperability information…”  144
2) “…the tying of the Windows client PC operating system and Windows Media Player.”  145
The interoperability information was needed by Microsoft’s competitors  “…to viably 
compete as a work group server operating system supplier.”  If comparing with Google Android 146
case, the question of interoperability is mitigated for investigation because Google has openly 
accessible CCD where it states all necessary information on interoperability plus the MADA 
which enhances interoperability.  
With regard to tying, the question is highly relevant for the Google Android case as the 
facts behind both are similar. The principles developed in Microsoft are relevant in relation to 
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Google Android. Furthermore, the Commission assessed if the tying included infringement on the 
basis of Article 82 EC (Article 102 TFEU) according to four criteria: firstly, Microsoft’s 
dominance in PC operating systems market, secondly, the products, namely media player and PC 
operating system are distinct, thirdly, there is no way consumers can buy Windows without 
Windows Media Player and in the fourth place assert that the tying restricts competition across 
media players market. The Commission found it true for all aspects and in the decision required 
Microsoft to offer Windows PC operations system separately from Windows Media Player and 
imposed a time limit of 90 days. The Commission allowed a bundle of Windows and WMP, 
however it meant that only the manufacturers had to decide whether to put together those two 
products and then sell them. 
While the first and third matters are obvious, the second and fourth raise questions. In 
respect to distinct products, the Commission put a following argument forward 
…there existed independent manufacturers who specialised in the manufacture of the tied 
product, a fact which indicated that there was separate consumer demand and hence a 
distinct market for the tied product.  147
Microsoft disputed that the question is not set correctly, instead the Commission should have 
asked whether the tying and tied products are offered together frequently and what are the 
consumer needs with regard to Windows and WMP . The Court supported the Commission’s 
findings and stated “…it is quite possible that customers will wish to obtain the products together, 
but from different sources.”  It puts the argument in doubt, because the main coordinator is 148
Microsoft itself, thus selling the PC from different sources can only the reached through different 
manufacturers who are not fully able to integrate the Windows and WMP sufficiently. Microsoft 
was dissatisfied with the decision because the Commission paid attention only whether the tied 
product as they claimed, that is media player, and the tying product as they asserted, that is PC 
the operating system, are available separately from each other. Therefore, Microsoft stated that 
the right question to ask is “…whether the tying product is regularly offered without the tied 
product.”  Microsoft further claimed that there is no demand from consumer side to acquire 149
Windows PC operating system without media player or so called ‘media functionality’, thus there 
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is no manufacturer or operator who would market them separately. Microsoft insisted that “…a 
product should be defined primarily in terms of customer expectations and demands.”  150
However, the Commission at no time has analyzed the consumer intention and desire to buy 
client Windows PC operating system without Windows Media Player. Microsoft argued that the 
Commission applied the incorrect test in relation to distinct products, yet this Microsoft argument 
that the Commission should have instead asked whether there is consumer demand for such 
separate system fo both products was not recognized.  
The fourth matter concerns an anticompetitive effects. The Court stated that Microsoft 
leveraged its monopoly in PC OS market to the media player market, limited possibility to access 
other rival media players and made higher barriers to entry due to INE. Microsoft claimed that 
the Commission “…had to apply a new and highly speculative theory, relying on a prospective 
analysis of the possible reactions of third parties…”  to conclude that there are anticompetitive 151
and foreclosing effects, having acknowledged that it is not traditional tying case “At recital 841 
to the contested decision, the Commission acknowledged that the present case was not a 
‘classical tying case…”  Microsoft claimed that the Commission puts dominant undertakings 152
which are trying to develop technology and innovate in a disadvantage, when the Commission 
obliges that “…such features be made removable whenever a third party markets a standalone 
product that provides the same or similar functionalities.”  Finally, Microsoft argued that the 153
merging of the Windows Media Player into the Windows PC operating system since 1999 is a 
rational and essential procedure in order to innovate and develop such a system. Moreover, it 
ensured the regular advancement of the media functionality. Microsoft additionally stated that the 
matter that “…tying takes the form of the technical integration of one product in another…”  is 154
enough to find out that the tying does not mean that “…integration cannot be qualified as the 
bundling of two separate products.”  155
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Overall, it can be observed that the Google Android case has the same issues with tying as 
Microsoft was dealing more than a decade ago. The difference is that Google is working on a 
mobile platform Android rather than PC. Consequently, Google is tying the Google Search app 
and browser app (Chrome) in bundle with Google Play Store.  
PART VI - PROPOSALS FOR REGULATING DIGITAL MARKETS EFFECTIVELY 
The Google Android case serves as a good indication that the competition law in digital sector, 
particularly, Article 102 TFEU, has some weak points in regulating the highly innovative firms 
operating in a digital network. Additionally, it requires a large amount of time to give a court 
decision, as it is observed in Microsoft. The digital companies are changing so fast that when the 
court gives its decision, the digital company is not dominant anymore or the matter becomes 
irrelevant. For example, when the Court of First Instance rejected Microsoft’s appeal in 2007, 
there was little demand left for WMP and it became old-fashioned as the last ever known version 
of Windows Media Player was released in 2009. 
…an antitrust case involving a new-economy firm may drag on for so long relative to the 
changing conditions of the industry as to become irrelevant.  156
Many legal writers are of opinion that current competition law is not well suited with regard to 
highly dynamic development of digital sector. The digital platforms are of high complexity. Diker 
Vanberg suggests  that the issue at stake is that competition authorities do not base the 157
investigation on strong economic analysis. “…the influence of economics had not been felt as 
strongly under Article 102 TFEU as it has been under 101 TFEU…”  For example, Article 101 158
TFEU has guidelines prepared by leading economists, block exemptions specified. Another view 
is that the issue remains on institutional side. Posner argues that  
…enforcement agencies and courts do not have adequate technical resources, and do not 
move fast enough, to deal effectively with a very complex business sector that changes 
very rapidly.  159
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The fact that the competition authorities and courts are working on cases with weak technical 
resources and insufficient economic analyses puts them in difficulties and inaccuracies when 
assessing the general market and dominance. For example, the European Parliament “…
welcomes…the appointment of special advisers to the Commissioner focusing on future 
challenges of digitalisation for competition policy….”160
As Dolmans and Leyden specify , this analysis is difficult because digital platforms 161
incur ever changing competitive character. Moreover, the digital platforms lead in multi-homing 
and generate no switching costs. The issue is underlined in the expressed opinion by the 
European Parliament in the Annual Report on Competition policy. In particular, European 
Parliament 
…stresses the urgent need for a framework that while promoting data innovation and new 
business models, effectively addresses the challenges of the data-driven and algorithm 
economy…  162
As the new economy sectors are distinct from the initial ones, they impose new challenges for 
competition authorities to produce analysis. “In literature, both lawyers and economists agree that 
a new way to approach competition law is required.”  There is a potential for the current 163
assessment of market and dominance to improve. Thus, there is a need to specify how EU 
competition law could be advanced in order to be more efficient in relation to innovative 
economy companies.  
1. Proposals by Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer 
The report on competition policy for the digital era produced by a legal scholar, engineer and 
economist implies that the basis of EU competition law integrated in Article 102 TFEU is 
sufficient to safeguard competition in digital era. However, the basis should be improved as “…
specific characteristics of platforms, digital ecosystems, and the data economy require established 
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concepts, doctrines and methodologies…competition enforcement…to be adapted and 
refined.”  The core of the report claims that innovation can be stimulated by stronger 164
enforcement of competition rules, therefore the amendments of competition enforcement regime 
should be made. In general, the goals for EU competition law in digital era are based on stronger 
enforcement of competition rules, thus the following adjustments are proposed.  
First of all, the standard of consumer welfare should be broadened. “In recent years many 
competition authorities have stressed the central importance of consumer welfare when 
interpreting and applying competition law.”  In the digital economy consumers are not 165
considered only as the end users but also ‘business users’ or ‘intermediate consumers’ operating 
within digital platform in order to reduce misunderstandings. Consumer welfare standard 
includes both. Moreover, the report suggests that “…the relevant timeframe and the standard of 
proof need to be rethought.”  Otherwise assessing harm results in a high degree of probability. 166
In some cases it is even possible to compute the “expected” consumer welfare to reduce 
hypothetical assumptions. The main difference form current framework is that the dominant 
undertakings, however, are not prohibited to apply their strategies in the presence of “…clearly 
documented consumer welfare gains.”   167
Secondly, the definition of market boundaries is not certain in digital industries as it is in 
traditional markets. Therefore, the report suggests that the definition of the market should be laid 
aside 
…less emphasis should be put on the market definition part of the analysis, and more 
importance attributed to the theories of harm and identification of anti-competitive 
strategies.  168
Thirdly, the market power should be assessed case by case. It has to be based on “…behavioural 
economics insights about the strength of consumers’ biases towards default options…”  because 169
it might be the case that there are no objections towards tech companies from consumer side in 
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relation with default options. In this sense the firm can be considered powerful only if it 'doing its 
own thing' despite consumer objections. Moreover, the competition authorities should take into 
account the access to data. “Any discussion of market power should…analyse…the access to data 
available to the presumed dominant firm but not to competitors…”  170
Fourthly,  as the tech giants produce uncertainties due to dynamic change of technologies 
“…there will be uncertainty about the consequences of any competition policy intervention or 
non-intervention.”  Thus, it would be effective to base investigation on a Joskow and 171
Klevorick  ‘error-cost’ test. It is not current ‘more likely than not’ approach but the error cost 172
framework. The decision of EU competition authorities to intervene or not would be different 
under both approaches. Under the error cost framework, it is even attainable that the behavior of 
an undertaking with a smaller probability of being anticompetitive results in higher costs in the 
case of not interfering in it. Hence, the report suggests that competition authorities should try to 
integrate the error costs into legal tests.  
Fifthly, EU competition law is general, broad and flexible, but at the same time there is no 
specificity, which reduces flexibility and makes investigations lengthy, “…competition law – and 
in particular Article 102 TFEU – plays a useful role as a “background regime” ”  while “…a 173
better understanding of many of the characteristic features of the digital economy….will inform 
the development of competition policy.”  Furthermore, the report stresses that “…we will find 174
that some issues…arise frequently and systematically enough that a new regulatory regime is 
warranted.”  Finally, the competition enforcement is not substituted by regulation but rather 175
supplemented.  
In relation to the importance of access of data by an undertaking when assessing the 
market power, the regulation has a special role. The report calls to include the use of regulation 
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on a sector specific bases. For example, the general rule which obliges firms to ensure data 
access, probably interoperability, is derived form Article 102 TFEU, but if a dominant 
undertaking is required to ensure constant data access, the “…ensuring frictionless data 
interoperability on an ongoing basis will surpass the capacities of competition authorities.”  176
Therefore, such cases require an ongoing regulation and sometimes it should be sector specific. 
The writers of the report ensure that “…mandated data access will therefore, in the end, be a 
sector-specific regime, subject to some sort of regulation and regulatory oversight.”  177
Overall, considering all propositions of the report, the current case decisions, such as 
Google Android would differ as the investigation is forecasted to go in another direction and 
analysis of anti-competitive behavior is based on different tests and concepts. The report is 
directed under the request of current Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, thus the directions of 
stronger enforcement proposed in the report will be introduced by her successor, following 2019. 
In the coming years, the report will serve as an enforcement program for digital markets.  
CONCLUSION 
Digitalization transformed the view on new economy markets. The dynamic advancement in 
innovation by digital companies brought challenges for competition authorities mainly from two 
perspectives. Firstly, the dynamic nature of digital markets adds to the complexity of competition 
authorities in the process of assessment. The progressive and unstable economic outlook 
produces uncertainty about competition, the harm on consumers and the effects on disturbing 
innovation. Secondly, the enforcement of competition law extent in dealing with dynamic 
competition in digital markets is questionable. The new economy markets bring the new types of 
transactions, data amounts, new economic models and business schemes, exercising a deep 
economic analysis. It all makes EU competition law, its strengths and effectiveness controversial.  
Due to these challenges, application of Article 102 TFEU has its downsides in dealing 
with digital markets. The research has revealed the following disadvantages: 
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I. Price (SSNIP) or traditional model of assessing market power by having a look on market 
shares is not suited for digital platforms and its innovation cycles as the digital companies are 
usually offering their products for free; 
II. No sufficient effects-based approach indicates that there is no detailed examination of the 
case facts and economic analysis e.g. ‘tying' in Google Android is treated as abusive although 
it provides convenient way for manufacturers to pre-install apps, helps to avoid licensing fees 
and reduces prices for manufacturers and users, e.g. in Microsoft, the consumer demand was 
not taken into account; 
III. There is a risk of protecting competitors rather competition, when placing a special 
responsibility on a dominant undertaking, in can deter innovation; 
IV. The Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 TFEU does not provide a ‘safe harbour’ due to 
incorporated 'likeliness’ and ‘competition on merits’; 
V. No efficient way of assessing interdependency of sides in two-sided platforms;
VI. It is time consuming to define the relevant market, as digital platforms have many of them. 
There is a risk to achieve a static view on it.
Furthermore, despite the benefits of the basis of Article 102 TFEU and its broad scope, 
there are far more drawbacks and EU competition law is not effective in regulating digital 
markets. The answer to the Bachelor Thesis question is that EU competition law, in particular 
Article 102 TFEU is effective in regulating digital markets to low extent. On the basis of the 
above mentioned, it is objective to add that the hypothesis ‘the current framework of EU 
competition law is not fully appropriate for the regulation of digital markets’ is efficiently 
justified. 
It is recommended that the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU should be supplemented by 
more efficient definitions, tools, tests. To improve it is suggested for competition authorities to 
enforce it by conducting solid analysis on new economy markets and rethink the tools used 
before, namely, supplement Article 102 TFEU enforcement with sector-specific regulation, 
broaden the standard of consumer welfare, allow for standard of proof by presenting consumer 
welfare, impose timeframe, not to focus on defining the market, place more attention on theories 
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of harm, take into account consumers biases and to base investigation on error-cost’ test to 
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